Abstract-This paper studies the physical layer security in a multiple-input-multiple-output (MIMO) dual-functional radarcommunication (DFRC) system, which communicates with downlink cellular users and tracks radar targets simultaneously. Here, the radar targets are considered as potential eavesdroppers which might eavesdrop the information from the communication transmitter to legitimate users. To ensure the transmission secrecy, we employ artificial noise (AN) at the transmitter and formulate optimization problems by minimizing the signal-tointerference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) received at radar targets, while guaranteeing the SINR requirement at legitimate users. We first consider the ideal case where both the target angle and the channel state information (CSI) are precisely known. The scenario is further extended to more general cases with target location uncertainty and CSI errors, where we propose robust optimization approaches to guarantee the worst-case performances. Accordingly, the computational complexity is analyzed for each proposed method. Our numerical results show the feasibility of the algorithms with the existence of instantaneous and statistical CSI error. In addition, the secrecy rate of secure DFRC system grows with the increasing angular interval of location uncertainty.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE increasing spectrum congestion has intensified the efforts in dynamic spectrum licensing and soon spectrum is to be shared between radar and communication applications. Govermental organizations such as the US Department of Defence (DoD) have a documented requirement of releasing 865 MHz to support telemetry by the year of 2025, but only 445 MHz is available at present [1] . As a result, the operating frequency bands of communication and radar are overlapped with each other [2] , which leads to mutual interference between two systems. Furthermore, both systems have been recently given a common spectrum portion by the Federal Communication Commission (FCC) [3] - [5] . To enable the efficient usage of the spectrum, research efforts are well underway to address the issue of communication and radar spectrum sharing (CRSS).
Aiming for realizing the spectral coexistence of individual radar and communication systems, several interference mitigation techniques have been proposed in [6] - [11] . As a step further, dual-functional radar-communication (DFRC) system that is capable of realizing not only the spectral coexistence, but also the shared use of the hardware platform, has been regarded as a promising research direction [12] - [15] . It is noteworthy that the DFRC technique has already been widely explored in numerous civilian and military applications, including 5G vehicular network [16] , WiFi based indoor positioning [17] , low-probability-of-intercept (LPI) communication [18] as well as the advanced multi-function radio frequency concept (AMRFC) [19] .
In the DFRC system, radar and communication functionalities are realized by a well-designed probing waveform that carries communication signalling and data. Evidently, this operation implicates security concerns, which are largely overlooked in the relevant DFRC literature. It is known that typical radar requires to focus the transmit power towards the directions of interest to obtain a good estimation of the targets. Nevertheless, in the case of DFRC transmission, critical information embedded in the probing waveform could be leaked to the radar targets, which might be potential eavesdroppers at the adversary's side. To this end, it is essential to take information security into consideration for the DFRC design. In the communication literature, physical layer security has been widely investigated, where the eavesdroppers' reception can be crippled by exploiting transmit degrees of freedom (DoFs) [20] . MIMO secrecy capacity problems were considered in [21] - [23] . Besides, another meaningful technique for enabling physical layer secrecy was presented in [20] , [24] , namely artificial noise (AN) aided transmission. Furthermore, the AN generation algorithms studied in [25] , [26] were with the premise of publicly known channel state information (CSI) in a fading environment. Moreover, some concurrent ANaided studies employed cooperative jammers to improve secure communication [27] , [28] .
Given the dual-functional nature of the DFRC systems, the secrecy issue can be addressed on the aspect of either radar or communication. From the perspective of the radar system, existing works focus on the radar privacy maintenance [8] , [29] , [30] . A functional architecture was presented in [8] for the control center aiming at coordinating the cooperation between radar and communication while maintaining the pri-
• We first consider the ideal scenario under the assumptions of perfect CSI and known precise location of targets. The beampattern is formed by approaching to a given benchmark radar beampattern. By doing so, the formulated optimization problem can be firstly recast as Fractional programming (FP) problem [33] , and then solved by the SDR.
• We investigate the problem under the practical condition of target location uncertainty, where we formulate a beampattern with a given angular interval that the targets might fall into.
• We impose the imperfect communication CSI to the optimization in addition to the above constraints, where worst-case FP problems are formulated to minimize the maximum SINR at the target with bounded CSI errors.
• We consider the statistical CSI, which is more practical due to significantly reduced feedback requirements [34] . To tackle this scenario, we further formulate the eavesdropper SINR minimization problem considering the error bound of statistical CSI.
• We derive the computational complexity for each proposed algorithm. This paper is organized as follows. Section II gives the system model. The optimization problems based on perfect CSI are addressed in Section III and IV for precise location and uncertain direction of targets, respectively. In Section V and VI, more general context of imperfect CSI is considered, which addresses issues with imperfect CSI under norm-bounded and statistical errors, respectively. Section VII provides numerical results, and Section VIII concludes the paper.
Notations: Unless otherwise specified, matrices are denoted by bold uppercase letters (i.e., H), vectors are represented by bold lowercase letters (i.e., x), and scalars are denoted by normal font (i.e., α). Subscripts indicate the location of the entry in the matrices or vectors (i.e., s i,j and l n are the (i, j)-th and the n-th element in S and l, respectively). tr (·) and vec (·) denote the trace and the vectorization operations.
H , (·) * and (·) † stand for transpose, Hermitian transpose, complex conjugate and Moore-Penrose pseudo-inverse of the matrices, respectively. diag (·) represents the vector formed by the diagonal elements of the matrices and rank (·) is rank operator. · , · ∞ and · F denote the l 2 norm, l ∞ and the Frobenius norm respectively. E {·} denotes the statistical expectation.
[·] + denotes max {·, 0}.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a dual-functional MIMO DFRC system, which consists of a DFRC base station, legitimate users and target which is a potential eavesdropper, as shown in Fig. 1 . The DFRC system is equipped with uniform linear array (ULA) of N antennas, serving K single-antenna users, while detecting a single point-like target. For convenience, the multi-antenna transmitter, the legitimate users and the target will be referred as Alice, Bobs and Eve respectively.
A. Signal Model
In the scenario shown in Fig. 1 , the DFRC base station Alice intends to send confidential information to single-antenna legitimate users, i.e. Bobs, with the presence of the potential eavesdropper, i.e. Eve. The received symbol vector at Bobs can be modeled as y = Hx + z
where
N is the transmitted signal vector, z is the noise vector, with z ∼ CN 0, σ 2 I N . Consider AN-aided transmit beamforming, the transmit vector x can be written as
where s ∈ C K is the desired symbol vector of Bobs, where we assume E ss
is the beamforming matrix, n is an artificial noise vector generated by Alice to avoid leaking information to Eves. It is assumed that n ∼ CN (0, R N ). Additionally, we assume that the desired symbol vector s and the artificial noise vector n are independent with each other. According to [9] , it is presumed that the above signal is used for both radar and communication operations, where each communication symbol is considered as a snapshot of a radar pulse. Then, the covariance matrix of radar system can be given as
where W i w i w H i . Then, the beampattern can be expressed as
where θ is the angle of target, a (θ) = 1 e j2π∆ sin(θ) · · · e j2π(N −1)∆ sin(θ) T ∈ C N ×1 denotes the steering vector of the transmit antenna array, and ∆ is the interval between adjacent antennas being normalized by the wavelength.
B. Metrics
To evaluate the performance of the system, we define a number of performance metrics in this subsection. Initially, based on the aforementioned system model, the SINR of the i-th user can be written as
where n i is the AN of i-th user. Equation (5) can be simplified
(6) The achievable transmission rate of legitimate users is given as R Ci = log 2 (1 + SINR i ) .
Likewise, based on the given signal model in (3) and (4), SINR at Eve can be given as [35] 
where α represents the propagation loss in radar system. The achievable transmission rate of Eve can be expressed as
Additionally, the transmit power is expressed as
Given the achievable transmission rates of Bobs and Eve, the achievable secrecy rate of the system is defined as [36] 
III. MINIMIZING SINR OF EVE WITH PREMISE OF PERFECT CSI AND TARGET DIRECTION
In this section, we aim to enhance the secrecy rate by minimizing the SINR of Eve and setting a lower threshold of SINR for the legitimate users, i.e. Bobs. The optimization problem is based on the assumption that the channel information from Alice to Bobs in the communication system is known perfectly. Meanwhile, the precise direction of the detected target is known to the transmitter. We shall relax the above assumptions in the following sections.
A. Problem Formulation
Let us firstly consider the SINR E minimization problem, which should guarantee: a) individual SINR requirement at each legitimate user, b) transmit power budget and c) a desired radar spatial beampattern. Note that an ideal radar beampattern should be obtained before designing the beamforming and artificial noise, which can be generated by solving the following constrained least-squares (LS) problem [9] , [37] as an example
where η is a scaling factor, P 0 represents the transmission power budget, {θ m } Given a covariance matrix R d that corresponds to a welldesigned MIMO radar beampattern, the fractional programming optimization problem of minimizing SINR E can be formulated as
where the constraints [20] . θ 0 represents the direction of Eve known at Alice 1 , γ bp is the pre-defined threshold that constraints the mismatch between designed covariance matrix R X and the desired R d , and finally γ b denotes the predefined SINR threshold of each legitimate user.
First, let us employ the SDR approach by relaxing the optimization problem by omitting the rank (W i ) = 1 constraint in (13f), which can be written as
By noting the fact that problem (14) is still non-convex due to the fractional objective function, we propose in the following an iterative approach to solve the problem efficiently.
B. Efficient Solver
Following [33] , (14) is single-ratio FP problem, which can be solved by employing the Dinkelbach's transform demonstrated in [38] , where the globally optimal solution can be obtained by solving a sequence of SDPs. To develop the algorithm, we firstly introduce a scaling factor c = SINR E , which is an auxiliary variable. We then define two scaling variables U and V, which are nonnegative and positive respectively, where
The MIMO radar is assumed to be with two working modes including searching and tracking. In the search mode, the radar transmits a spatially orthogonal waveform, which formulates the omni-directional beampattern. Potential targets can be searched via the beampattern. Then, the radar is able to track potential targets via transmitting directional waveforms. Thus, the precise location is available to be known at Alice.
As a result, the FP problem (14) can be reformulated as
where c can be iteratively updated by
where t is the index of iteration. For clarity, we summarize the above in Algorithm 1. According to [33] , it is easy to prove the convergence of the algorithm given the nonincreasing property of c during each iteration. It is noted that the SDR approach generates an approximated solution to the optimization problem (13) by neglecting the rank-one constraint. Accordingly, eigenvalue decomposition or Gaussian randomization techniques are commonly employed to obtain a suboptimal solution.
Algorithm 1 Alogrithm for solving FP problem (14)
Input: (14) . Set the iteration threshold ε > 0. Initialize
while iter ≤ iter max and c iter+1 − c iter ≥ ε do 2. Solve the SDP problem (15). 3. Update c by (16) . 4 . iter = iter + 1. end while 6. Obtain approximated solutions by eigenvalue decomposition or Gaussian randomization.
C. Complexity Analysis
In this subsection, the computational complexity of Algorithm 1 is analyzed as follows. Note that SDP problems are commonly solved by the interior point method (IPM) [39] , which obtains an ǫ-optimal solution after a sequence of iterations with the given ǫ. In problem (15) , it is noted that the constraints are linear matrix inequality (LMI) except for (15b), which is a second-order cone (SOC) [40] constraint. Besides, we note that the solution is required to satisfy the rank-one constraint, the complexity of eigenvalue decomposition 2 is then taken into consideration, which is operated at the cost of O (K + 1) N 3 complex multiplications. Thus, we demonstrate the complexity in Table I , where N iter represents iteration times. For simplicity, the computational complexity can be given as O √ 2N iter ln (1/ǫ) K 3.5 N 6.5 +O (K + 1) N 3 by reserving the highest order term.
IV. EVE'S SINR MINIMIZATION WITH UNCERTAINTY IN THE TARGET DIRECTION AND PERFECT CSI
In practice, the precise location of the target is difficult to be known at transmitter. In this section, we consider the scenario where a rough estimate of the target angle, instead of its precise counterpart, is available at Alice. Therefore, the following beampattern design aims at achieving both a desired main-beam width covering the possible angle uncertainty interval of the target as well as a minimized sidelobe power in a prescribed region.
A. Problem Formulation
In this subsection, we consider the case that the angle uncertainty interval of the target is roughly known within the angular interval [θ 0 − ∆θ, θ 0 + ∆θ]. To this end, the target from every possible direction should be taken in to consideration when formulating the optimization problem. Accordingly, the objective is given as the sum of Eve's SINR at all the possible locations as follows. Due to the uncertainty of target location, wider beampattern needs to be formulated towards the uncertain angular interval to avoid missing the target. Inspired by the 3dB main-beam width beampattern design for MIMO radar [41] , we propose a scheme aiming at keeping a constant power in the uncertain angular interval, which can be formulated as the following optimization problem
rank
where θ 0 is the main-beam location, Ω denotes the sidelobe region of interest, Φ denotes the wide main-beam region, γ s is the bound of the sidelobe power. Likewise, recall the problem (13), SDR technique is adopted by neglecting rank-1 constraint in (17h). To solve the above sum-of-ratio problem, according to [33] , we equivalently recast transform the minimization problem as
It is noted that problem (18) is still non-convex. The approach to solve this sum-of-ratio FP problem is described in the following.
B. Efficient Solver
To present the solution to problem (18), we firstly refer to [33] and denote
One step further, the sum-of-ratio problem is equivalent to the following optimization problem, which can be rewritten in the form
where y denotes a collection of variables {y 1 , · · · , y M }. The optimal y m can be obtained in the following closed form when θ m is fixed
To this end, the problem (19) can be solved by the SDR technique. Then, eigenvalue decomposition or Gaussian randomization is required to get the approximated solution. For clarity, the above procedure is summarized in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Algorithm for solving sum-of-ratio problem (19) Input: (17) by (19) . Set the iteration threshold ε > 0. while iter ≤ iter max and y iter+1 − y iter ≥ ε do 2. Solve the new convex optimization problem. 3. Update y by (20) . 4. Get updated W i , ∀i, and R N by solving (19) using SDR. 5. iter = iter + 1. end while 6. Obtain approximate solutions by eigenvalue decomposition or Gaussian randomization.
C. Complexity Analysis
We end this section by computing the complexity of solving problem (19) . It is noted that all the constraints can be considered as LMIs in optimization problem (19) . We denote Φ 0 = card(Φ) and Ω 0 = card(Ω) as the cardinality of Φ and Ω, respectively. Likely, eigenvalue decomposition operation is required as well, with the cost of O (K + 1) N 3 . Thus, referring to [39] , we give the computational complexity in Table I , which can be simplified as O 3
3 by reserving the highest order.
V. ROBUST BEAMFORMING WITH IMPERFECT CSI AND TARGET DIRECTION UNCERTAINTY
In this section, based on the models presented in the previous sections, we consider the case that perfect channel information is not available at the base station. By relying on the method of robust optimization, we generalize an optimization problem to obtain beamforming design that is robust to the channel uncertainty, which is bounded in a spherical region. Meanwhile, to guarantee the generality, we minimize the worst-case SINR received at the target in the angular interval of possible location of potential eavesdropper.
A. Problem Formulation
According to [42] , an additive channel error model of i-th downlink user can be formulated as h i =h i + e i , wherẽ h i is the estimated channel information known at Alice, and e i denotes the channel uncertainty within the spherical region ℑ i = {e i | e i 2 ≤ µ 2 i }. Following the well-known Sprocedure , ∀e H i e i ≤ µ 2 i , the constraint that guarantees the worst-case SINR of legitimates users can be reformulated as
Then, we minimize the possible maximum Eve SINR in the main-beam region of interest, which yields the following robust optimization problem
where Φ = [θ 0 − ∆θ, θ 0 + ∆θ] is the main-beam region of interest, m = 1, · · · , M . M represents the number of detecting angles in the interval Φ, and finally t = [t 1 , · · · , t K ] is an auxiliary vector relying on the S-procedure.
B. Efficient Solver
To solve problem (22) , the SDR approach is adopted again by dropping the rank-1 constraint in (22i). Moreover, the objective function (22a) can be transformed to a max-min problem initially which is given as
To verify this, we introduce a variable z and define
The objective function (23) can be rewritten as max
Wi,RN ,ti,z z , which subjects to
W i and any other contraints in (19) . Likewise, we denote
The aforementioned constraint is equivalent to
which is a less-than-max inequality, so max ym can be integrated into the objective. Consequently, problem (22) is reformulated as
where y m is an auxiliary variable, each y m corresponds to the radar detecting angles θ m in the main-beam region of interest Φ. We refer the rest variables to the definitions which we presented in the previous sections. Note that problem (24) is convex and can be readily tackled. Here, we define a collection of variables y = {y 1 , · · · , y M }. To solve this problem, we apply the quadratic transform and optimize the primal variables W i , R N , t i and the auxiliary variable collection y in an alternating manner. When the primal variables are obtained by initializing the collection y, the optimal y m can be updated by
To this end, eigenvalue decomposition or Gaussian randomization is required to obtain approximated solutions. For clarity, solution to problem (24) can be summarized as Algorithm 3.
C. Complexity Analysis
The complexity of Algorithm 3 is analyzed in this subsection. Similarly, Φ and Ω can be regarded as discrete domains. We denote Φ 0 = card(Φ) and Ω 0 = card(Ω) as the cardinality of Φ and Ω, respectively. All the constraints in problem (24) are LMIs. Specifically, we notice that the problem is composed by 3Φ 0 + Ω 0 + K + 1 LMI constraints of size 1, 2K + 2 LMI constraints of size N , and K LMI constraints of size N + 1. Considering eigenvalue decomposition operation is required at the cost of O (K + 1) N 3 , it follows that the complexity is given in Table I . For simplicity, we reserve the highest order of computational complexity, which can be given
Algorithm 3 Method for Solving multiple-ratio FP problem (24)
Input: A (θ m ) ,h i , σ 2 , α, γ b , γ s , P 0 , CSI estimation error threshold µ i > 0, definite the main-beam width Φ, iteration threshold ε > 0, iter max 2. Initialization: Set initial values for y (0) , y (1) , which y (1) − y (0) > ε. while iter iter max and y (iter+1) − y (iter) ε do 1. Reformulate problem (19) by replacing the fractional objective function with the form in (22b). 2. Reconstruct the problem with variable z. 3. Solve the optimization problem, and then update y by (23). 4. Update the primal variables by (22) , over R N , W i , ∀i for fixed y. end while Output: R N , W i , t i , z, ∀i.
6. Obtain approximate solutions by eigenvalue decomposition or Gaussian randomization.
VI. ROBUST OPTIMAL BEAMFORMING WITH STATISTICAL CSI AND TARGET DIRECTION UNCERTAINTY
In this section, we consider the extension of the scenario in section V, where channel from Alice to Bobs is rapidly time-varying. As a result, the instantaneous CSI is difficult to be estimated [43] . Note that the second-order channel statistics, which vary much more slowly, can be obtained by the BS through long-term feedback. Nevertheless, even when the statistical CSI is known at Alice, it always includes uncertainty. Herewith, we take the uncertainty matrix into consideration by employing additive errors to the channel covariance.
A. Problem Formulation
As the statistical CSI is known to BS instead of instantaneous CSI , we rewrite the SINR of the i-th user as
denotes the i-th user's downlink channel covariance matrix with uncertainty. Therefore, the true channel covariance matrix can be modeled as R hi =R hi + ∆ i , ∀i, where ∆ i , ∀i are the estimated error matrices. The Frobenius norm of the error matrix of i-th user is assumed to be upper-bounded by a known constant δ i , which can be expressed as ∆ i ≤ δ i . To this end, based on Lagrange dual function [34] , [44] , the constraint corresponding to QoS of i-th user can be formulated as
Note that problem (28) is a convex SDP problem and can be solved in polynomial time using interior-point algorithms [34] . To this end, approximated solution can be obtained by eigenvalue decomposition or Gaussian randomization.
B. Complexity Analysis
The complexity of problem (27) is given as follows. As is noted in problem (28), almost all the constrains are LMI except for the SOC constraint (28c). Likewise, we denote Φ 0 = card(Φ) and Ω 0 = card(Ω) as the cardinality of Φ and Ω. Note that the problem is composed by K SOC constraints of size 1, Ω 0 + 3Φ 0 + 1 LMI constraints of size 1, and 4K + 2 LMIs of size N . Accordingly, we compute the complexity as is shown in Table I , which can be simply demonstrated
which is the complexity of each iteration. Then, The calculated complexities of all the proposed optimizations are summarised in Table 1 . VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS To evaluate the proposed methods, numerical results based on Monte Carlo simulations are shown in this section to validate the effectiveness of the proposed beamforming method. Without loss of generality, each entry of channel matrix H is assumed to obey standard Complex Gaussian distribution, i.e. h i,j ∼ CN (0, 1). We assume that the DFRC base station employs a ULA with half-wavelength spacing between adjacent antennas. In the following simulations, the number of antennas is set as N = 18 and the number of legitimate users is K = 4. The constrained beamforming design problems in Section IISection V are solved by the classic SDR technique using the CVX toolbox [45] .
A. Beam Gain And Secrecy Rate Analysis
We first show the resultant radar beampattern in Fig. 2 with different angular interval of target location uncertainty, i.e. [−5
• , 5
• ] and [−10
The SINR threshold of each legitimate user is set as γ b = 10dB. The narrow beampattern when the target location is precisely known at the BS is set as a benchmark. It is found that the desired beampattern with wide main-beam is obtained by solving the proposed algorithms, which maintain the same power in the region of possible target location. Additionally, it is noted that with the expansion of location uncertainty angular interval, the power gain of mainbeam reduces. 
Perfect CSI and Target Location Uncertainty
Imperfect CSI and Target Location Uncertainty
Statistical CSI and Target Location Uncertainty The achievable secrecy rate in terms of increasing SINR threshold of each user is demonstrated in Fig. 3 , where the power budget is set as P 0 = 20dBm and P 0 = 30dBm respectively. In this case, we set the sidelobe power threshold γ s = 40dB. Basically, in the SINR E minimization problem, the secrecy rate increases with the growth of γ b . It is noteworthy that the system achieves higher secrecy rate when both the target location and CSI are precisely known. Besides, when we increase the power budget, the secrecy rate grows to some extent.
In Fig. 4 , we evaluate the convergence of target SINR and secrecy rate. In these cases, the same system parameters are set as previous simulations. In Fig. 4(a) , the SINR of the target is confirmed to convergent to a minimum. In robust beamforming design problems, the SINR of target decreases slightly with the increasing iteration number, which results in the slight growth of secrecy rate as is shown in Fig. 4(b) .
B. Trade-off Between The Performance Of Radar And Communication System
In this subsection, we evaluate the performance trade-off between radar and communication system. Fig. 5 shows the secrecy rate performance with various angular intervals for γ b = 10dB and γ b = 15dB. The main-beam power decreases when the target uncertainty increases, then the leaking information would get less, which improve the secrecy rate. As is demonstrated in Fig. 5 , the secrecy rate increases with the growth of target uncertainty interval. Besides, with 5dB growth of legitimate user SINR threshold, the secrecy rate increases 0.5bit/s/Hz approximately. Fig. 6 demonstrates the secrecy rate performance versus the threshold of sidelobe with P 0 = 30dBm, ∆θ = 5
• , which reveals the trade-off between the performance of radar and communication systems. In Algorithm 2, the power difference between main beam and sidelobe increases with the growth of γ s , which results in the increasing possibility of information leaking. As the numerical result shown in Fig. 6 , it is notable that the secrecy rate decreases with the growth of γ s , especially the tendency gets obvious when γ s is greater than 30dB. 
C. Robust Beamforming Performance
As the norm of CSI error is bounded by a constant, the secrecy rate performance versus error bound is illustrated in Fig. 7 , with different location uncertainty. With the growth of error bound, the achievable SINR at each legitimate user keeps being above the given threshold but not a constant according to constraints (24c) and (27b). We note that the achievable secrecy rate reduces after a certain value with the increasing error bound, because of the different changing rate between target SINR and user SINR corresponding to various error bounds in Fig. 7 . Whereas, as is shown in Fig. 8 , the secrecy rate keeps increasing with the growth of error bound. In addition, the robust beamforming designs achieve higher secrecy rate when the location uncertainty is limited in a larger interval. 
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, optimization based beamforming designs have been addressed for MIMO DFRC system, which aimed at ensuring the security of information transmission in case of leaking to targets by adding AN at the transmitter to confuse the potential eavesdropper. Specifically, we have minimized the SINR of the target which is regarded as the potential eavesdropper while keeping the each legitimate user's SINR above a certain constant to ensure the secrecy rate of the DFRC system. Throughout this paper, the optimization beamforming problem has been designed with perfect CSI and imperfect CSI, as well as with the accurate and inaccurate target location information.
First of all, both precise location of target and perfect CSI have been assumed to be known at BS, which gained the highest secrecy rate according to the numerical results. When the target location was uncertain, the main-beam power has decreased with the growth of the uncertainty angular interval. Moreover, the secrecy rate versus different thresholds of sidelobe has been demonstrated, which revealed the trade-off between radar and communication system performance. Then, we have formulated target SINR minimization problem with imperfect instantaneous CSI and statistical CSI known to the base station respectively. As shown in the numerical results, the beamforming design has been feasible in both robust scenarios. Finally, simulation results have been presented to show the secrecy rate tendency effected by error bound with various target location uncertainty.
